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THE POST-CRAWFORD RISE IN VOTER ID LAWS: A
SOLUTION STILL IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM
David M. Faherty*
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
[I]f a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those
justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have
provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators.
Crawford v. Marion County, 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008)
We are focused on making sure that we meet our obligations that we’ve talked
about for years . . . . Voter ID, which is gonna allow Governor Romney to win the
state of Pennsylvania, [is] done.
Pennsylvania House Majority Leader Mike Turzai (2012)

I. INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board1, the Supreme Court upheld
Indiana’s voter identification law, which required registered voters to present
government-issued photo identification at the polls. Instead of applying heighted
scrutiny to a law that had an effect on voter qualifications, the Court simply
balanced the asserted state interest of protecting the integrity and reliability of
elections by preventing voter fraud against the burden imposed on eligible voters
who were prevented from voting because they did not possess the required form of
photo identification. Not persuaded by the fact that Indiana could not point to a
single instance of voter fraud, or that significant hurdles existed for eligible voters
in obtaining appropriate photo IDs, the Court upheld Indiana’s voter ID law.
Five years since Crawford, evidence of significant voter fraud has yet to be
uncovered in the United States, despite many concerted attempts to do so.2
Nevertheless, voter ID laws continue to be an extremely polarizing issue.
Proponents argue that without voter ID laws, there is no way to ensure the integrity
of elections or voter confidence in the democratic process.3 Opponents appeal to
the same values to argue against voter ID laws – that the integrity of elections and
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maine School of Law. The Author would like to thank
Professors Jim Friedman and Dmitry Bam for their valuable insights and the Maine Law Review staff for
their hard work and support throughout this process.
1. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
2. See Ivan Moreno, Republicans Look for Voter Fraud, Find Little, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 24,
2012, 1:22 PM, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/republicans-look-voter-fraud-find-little; Stephanie Saul,
Looking, Very Closely, for Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/09/17/us/politics/groups-like-true-the-vote-are-looking-very-closely-for-voter-fraud.html.
3. See Moreno, supra note 2; see Saul, supra note 2.
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voter confidence in the democratic process are severely limited when voter ID laws
disenfranchise a significant portion of the electorate.4
This Comment argues that the disparity in post-Crawford rulings on voter ID
laws results from the failure of the Court in Crawford to articulate a clear standard
of review that allows courts to take equal protection considerations into account
when deciding whether to uphold or invalidate voter ID laws. After surveying the
landscape of post-Crawford decisions on state voter ID laws, this Comment argues
that the balancing test articulated in Crawford is inherently unclear and should be
abandoned in favor of a heightened form of scrutiny when reviewing state laws that
impose new restrictions and voter qualifications. As the quotes above illustrate, it
is time for the Supreme Court to settle the issue of ensuring voting rights in the face
of the rising number of state voter ID laws.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON STATE VOTER
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Although the right to vote is not expressly guaranteed in the United States
Constitution, the Supreme Court has “often reiterated that voting is of the most
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.”5 The Supreme Court
has applied the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from “deny[ing] to
any person . . . the equal protection of the laws,”6 to voting. In Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections,7 the Court explained that “once the franchise is granted to the
electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”8 Furthermore, the Fifteenth Amendment
expressly protects the right to vote from racial discrimination, providing that “[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”9
Despite the Constitutional safeguards of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, “the blight of racial discrimination in voting . . . infected the
electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.”10 After
Reconstruction, many Southern states enacted ballot access measures specifically
designed to prevent blacks from voting, notoriously instituting poll taxes, literacy
tests, grandfather clauses, and property qualifications at the state and local levels.11
Though race-neutral on their face, these measures were deliberately crafted to

4. See generally KEESHA GASKINS & SUNDEEP IYER, THE CHALLENGE OF OBTAINING VOTER
IDENTIFICATION (Brennan Center for Justice ed., 2012); Nate Silver, Measuring the Effects of Voter
Identification Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/
measuring-the-effects-of-voter-identification-laws; Thomas B. Edsall, Killing a Fly with a Bazooka,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/killing-a-fly-with-abazooka.
5. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
8. Id. at 665.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
10. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
11. See, e.g., id. at 310-11; Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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severely limit the number of black voters. For example, when literacy tests were
enacted, “more than two-thirds of the adult [blacks] were illiterate while less than
one-quarter of the adult whites were unable to read or write.”12 In addition, the
Court in Katzenbach highlighted a key speech delivered by South Carolina Senator
Ben Tillman as evidence that ballot measures enacted in the South were designed
with the express purpose of disenfranchising blacks.13 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court invalidated many of these laws on the grounds that they violated the
Fifteenth Amendment,14 but many states were able to stay one step ahead of the
courts “by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been
struck down.”15
Against this backdrop of “unremitting and ingenious defiance of the
Constitution,”16 Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pursuant to
Congress’s authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment “by appropriate
legislation.”17 The Voting Rights Act was intended to eliminate the “insidious and
pervasive evil” of racial discrimination in voting,18 and jurisdictions covered by the
Act needed to demonstrate that a proposed change “neither has the purpose nor will
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color” in order for the change to take effect.19 Section 2 of the Voting Rights act
prohibits voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, or against language minority groups.20 Under the 1982 amendments to
Section 2, state or local laws violate the Voting Rights Act if they have the effect of
disadvantaging minority voters.21 Furthermore, Section 2 authorizes litigation
challenging state or local actions that are alleged to violate the section.22
In adopting the Voting Rights Act, Congress concluded that lawsuits
challenging election procedures were not sufficient as a means of stopping
discrimination in voting, because states often invented new and novel ways of
disenfranchising minority voters.23 In response to this problem, Congress adopted
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires preapproval of any attempt to
change “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting” in jurisdictions with a history of race

12. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311.
13. At the South Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1895, Senator Ben Tillman explained the
real aim of the new literacy test: “[T]he only thing we can do as patriots and as statesmen is to take from
[the ignorant blacks] every ballot that we can under the laws of our national government.” Id. at 310 n.9
(quoting JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 464
(1895)).
14. Id. at 311-12 (collecting cases).
15. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 57-58
(1975)).
16. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
18. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
20. Id. § 1973.
21. Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Stakes are Enormous’ in Voting Rights Case, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/court_elects_to_take_another_look_at_the_voting_rights_act.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a.
23. Chemerinsky, supra note 21.
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discrimination in voting.24 The preapproval, or “preclearance,” must come either
from the U.S. Attorney General, through an administrative procedure in the
Department of Justice, or from a three-judge federal court in the District of
Columbia through a request for a declaratory judgment.25
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 in Katzenbach,
and has continued to do so over subsequent Congressional reauthorizations.26 In
the 2006 reauthorization, Congress found that without the continued protections of
the Voting Rights Act, “racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of
their opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted,
undermining the significant gains made by minority voters in the last 40 years.”27
In a landmark case28 last term, the Supreme Court weakened the Voting Rights Act
by striking down Section 4’s current coverage formula. Substituting its judgment
on the nature and location of voter disenfranchisement in the United States for that
of Congress, the Court held that Section 4 failed to account for positive
developments29 in covered jurisdictions, “keeping the focus on decades-old data
relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting current
needs.”30
III. VOTING RIGHTS AND VOTER FRAUD: FEDERAL AND STATE APPROACHES
A. The Federal Approach
In Harper, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Virginia could not condition the
right to vote in a state election on the payment of a poll tax of $1.50.31 The Court
rejected the dissenters’ argument that a rational basis existed for the poll tax based
on Virginia’s interest in promoting civic responsibility by “weeding out those
[voters] who do not care enough about public affairs” to pay a small sum for the
privilege of voting.32 The Court applied a stricter standard than the rational basis
standard, concluding that a State “violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of
any fee an electoral standard.”33
The Court used the term “invidious
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).
25. Id.
26. See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 519 U.S. 9 (1996); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
27. An Act to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2, 120 Stat. 577, 578
(2006).
28. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
29. The Court highlighted that in covered jurisdictions, voter turnout and registration rates now
approach parity, blatant discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are now rare, and minority
candidates now hold office at unprecedented levels. Id. at 2625. Furthermore, the Court attributed these
great strides to the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 2626. Nevertheless, it held that the deterrent effect of
Section 5 on covered jurisdictions could not be immune from judicial scrutiny, because “no matter how
‘clean’ the record of covered jurisdictions, the argument could always be made that it was the deterrence
that accounted for the good behavior.” Id. at 2627.
30. Id. at 2629.
31. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
32. Id. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 666. (majority opinion).

274

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

discrimination” to describe this type of equal protection violation, and held that the
State’s conduct was invidious because it was irrelevant to the voter’s
qualifications.34
The Court later qualified the standard applied in Harper that even rational
restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter
qualifications. In Anderson v. Celebrezze,35 where an independent presidential
candidate challenged the constitutionality of Ohio’s early filing deadline for
independent candidates, the Court held that “evenhanded restrictions that protect
the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” are not invidious and
satisfy the Harper standard.36 Instead of using a “litmus test” approach that would
neatly separate valid from invalid restrictions, the Court in Anderson concluded
that a court must identify and evaluate the interests advanced by the state as
justifications for the burden imposed by the voting restrictions.37 The balancing
approach of Anderson has been used in subsequent election cases, including a case
involving Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting.38
In Burdick v. Takushi,39 where a registered voter challenged Hawaii’s
prohibition on write-in voting, the Court applied the Anderson standard for
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” and upheld Hawaii’s prohibition
despite the fact that it prevented a significant number of voters from participating
in Hawaii elections.40 In Burdick, the Court reaffirmed Anderson’s requirement
that a court evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election regulation weigh the
asserted injury to the right to vote against the “‘precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.’”41
In Norman v. Reed,42 where a new political party sought to overcome a
restriction on the use of its name to gain a place on a local ballot, the Court
identified the burden Illinois imposed on a political party’s access to the ballot.
After calling for Illinois to demonstrate a “corresponding interest sufficiently
weighty to justify the limitation,” the Court concluded that the restriction was not
justified by a narrowly drawn state interest of compelling importance.43
In recent years, Congress has enacted legislation to help the states modernize
their election procedures. For example, the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 (NVRA) establishes procedures aimed at both increasing the number of
registered voters for federal elections and protecting the integrity of voting and
elections.44 The NVRA requires applications for state-issued motor vehicle
driver’s licenses to serve as voter registration applications.45 Furthermore, the
NVRA also restricts the states’ ability to remove names from their lists of
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 666-67.
460 U.S. 780 (1983).
Id. at 788 n.9.
Id. at 789.
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
502 U.S. 279 (1992).
Id. at 288-89.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–1973gg -10 (2006).
Id. § 1973gg-3.
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registered voters.46
In addition, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) at the
urging of President Bush in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore47 and the 2000 general
election.48 HAVA requires every state to create and maintain computerized
statewide lists of all registered voters,49 and also requires the states to verify voter
information contained in voter registration applications by either the applicant’s
driver’s license number or the last four digits of the applicant’s social security
number.50 In addition, HAVA requires voters who registered to vote by mail and
who have not voted previously in a federal election to show either a form of current
and valid photo identification or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement,
government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name
and address of the voter.51
B. A State Approach: Missouri
Missouri provides an illustrative example of the state-based approach to
analyzing voter identification laws pre-Crawford. The Supreme Court of Missouri
took up the issue after a statute was enacted in 2006 that required registered voters
to present certain types of photographic identification issued by the state or federal
governments in order to cast their ballots.52 To block enforcement of the law,
known as Section 115.427, plaintiffs Kathleen Weinschenk and others sued the
State of Missouri on the grounds that Section 115.427 interfered with the
fundamental right to vote as protected by the constitutions of Missouri and the
United States.53 Furthermore, Ms. Weinschenk and the others claimed that the law
impermissibly required voters without photo identification, particularly lowincome, disabled, and elderly voters, to spend money on the necessary documents
such as birth certificates in order to obtain the requisite photo identification.54 The
trial court held that the law was unconstitutional because it violated Missourians’
right to vote and to equal protection of the laws, finding that the law unnecessarily
burdened the right to vote of registered voters who would not be allowed to vote
because they did not have a form of photo identification required by the law.55
The Missouri Supreme Court fully agreed with the argument of the state that a
compelling state interest existed in preventing voter fraud.56 The court, however,
held that the evidence presented to the trial court did not support the state’s
argument that the law’s photo identification requirement was narrowly tailored to

46. Id. § 1973gg-6(a)(3).
47. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
48. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (2006).
50. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i).
51. Id. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i).
52. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d. 201, 204 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam).
53. Id. The right to vote is expressly guaranteed to citizens who are qualified and registered under
Article I, Section 25 and Article VII, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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accomplish that purpose.57 The court’s holding was prompted by the state’s
acknowledgement that the photo identification requirement was intended to prevent
only impersonation at the polls, and would not affect fraud committed during
absentee ballot submission or voter registration.58 Furthermore, the evidence
presented at the trial court showed that the Missouri Legislature’s enactment in
2002 of statutory precautions in response to HAVA sufficiently eliminated the
potential risk of voter impersonation fraud.59
Finally, the state argued that the photo identification requirement nevertheless
should remain in place because it would reassure voters who perceived that fraud
existed.60 In response, the Missouri Supreme Court held that this justification
placed too great an encumbrance on Missourians’ right to vote given the complete
absence of even a single report of voter impersonation in Missouri since the state’s
implementation of the HAVA reforms.61
Because the statute placed a substantial burden on the fundamental right to
vote, the Missouri Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to Missouri’s voter ID
law.62 In applying strict scrutiny, the court held that the law was neither strictly
necessary nor narrowly tailored to meet the state’s compelling interests,63 and thus
violated equal protection and the fundamental right to vote in Missouri.64
C. Crawford and the Development of a Balancing Test
In Crawford, a majority of the Court agreed that Burdick rejected the argument
that strict scrutiny applies to all laws imposing a burden on the right to vote.65
However, the Stevens Plurality and the Scalia Concurrence disagreed over the
legacy of Burdick.66 Justice Stevens argued that the Court in Burdick rejected the
argument that strict scrutiny applies to all laws imposing a burden on the right to
vote, and instead applied the “flexible standard” set forth in Anderson.67 Justice
Scalia argued that Burdick created a novel “deferential ‘important regulatory
interests’ standard.”68
In Crawford, the plurality agreed that two state interests identified by Indiana
were “unquestionably relevant to the State’s interest in protecting the integrity and
reliability of the electoral process.”69 The plurality identified that the first state
57. Id.
58. Id. at 204-05.
59. Id. at 205. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that the only specific instance of possible voter
fraud that had occurred since the enactment of HAVA legislation involved an attempt by a person who
had voted absentee to then vote in person. Furthermore, this one instance of attempted voter fraud
would not have been prevented by Missouri’s photo identification law. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 215.
63. Id. at 217.
64. Id. at 221-22.
65. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 n.8 (2008); id. at 204 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
66. See id. at 190 n.8 (plurality opinion).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 191 (plurality opinion).
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interest was in deterring and detecting voter fraud.70 Indiana argued that it had an
interest in preventing voter fraud in response to the problem that the state’s voter
registration rolls included a large number of names of persons who were either
deceased or who no longer lived in Indiana.71 In addition, Indiana argued that it
had an interest in safeguarding voter confidence.72
The Stevens Plurality then turned to discuss each of these state interests. After
pointing to the implementation of federal statutes such as the NVRA and HAVA,
the plurality inferred that Congress seemed to believe that “photo identification is
one effective method of establishing a voter’s qualification to vote,” and that “the
integrity of elections is enhanced through improved technology.”73 The plurality
also emphasized that this conclusion was supported by a report published by the
Commission on Federal Election Reform,74 which stated that “some form of
identification is needed” at the polls because the United States is no longer a
country where “everyone knows each other.”75 The plurality also highlighted the
following findings and conclusions made in the report:
There is no evidence of extensive voter fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple
voting, but both occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election. The
electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or
detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters. Photo [identification cards]
currently are needed to board a plane, enter federal buildings, and cash a check.
76
Voting is equally important.

The plurality next discussed the state interest of preventing voter fraud, and
commented that the only kind of voter fraud that Indiana’s voter identification law
addressed was in-person voter impersonation at polling places.77 Nevertheless, the
plurality then stated that “[t]he record contains no evidence of any such fraud
actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.”78
The Stevens Plurality assumed the petitioners’ premise that the voter
identification law “may have imposed a special burden” on some voters, but held
that the petitioners did not assemble sufficient evidence to show that the special
burden was severe enough to warrant heightened scrutiny.79 In reviewing the
provisions of the Indiana law, the Court held that “[t]he severity of [the] burden is,
of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligible, voters without photo identification
may cast provisional ballots that will ultimately be counted . . . [if] they travel to
the circuit court clerk’s office within 10 days to execute the required affidavit.”80

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 193.
74. The Commission on Federal Election Reform was co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter
and former Secretary of State James A. Baker III.
75. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 193-94 (quoting COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING
CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2005)).
76. Id. at 194.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 199-200.
80. Id. at 199.
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Although a narrow ruling on the validity of a single state’s voter ID law,
Crawford nevertheless defined the parameters from which proponents and
opponents of voter ID laws would base their arguments in legal challenges that
followed. For example, the Court held that “for most voters . . . the inconvenience
of making a trip to the BMV [to obtain photo identification] . . . does not qualify as
a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase
over the usual burdens of voting.”81 In addition, because Indiana’s law allowed
eligible voters without the appropriate identification to sign an affidavit attesting to
their identity as a registered Indiana voter, the holding of Crawford is necessarily
limited to voter ID laws that allow for such alternative voting opportunities for
voters who lack the appropriate identification on election day.
IV. RECENT STATE ACTIONS TO PREVENT VOTER FRAUD
A. Pennsylvania
On March 14, 2012, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a law (“Act 18”)
requiring citizens voting in-person on election day to present photo identification.82
Made effective immediately, Act 18 changed Pennsylvania’s Election Code83 by
eliminating the distinction between photo identification and other forms of
acceptable identification by defining the term “proof of identification” as a list of
attributes of acceptable forms of photo identification.84 Act 18 also eliminated the
option for electors without photo identification to present an alternative form of
81. Id. at 198.
82. Act of March 14, 2012, P.L. 195, No. 18, 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. 2012-18 (West) (amending the
definition of “proof of identification” in the Penn. Election Code) [hereinafter Act 18].
83. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2600-3591.
84. Act 18, 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. 2012-18. Act 18 defines “proof of identification” as the
following:
“(1) In the case of an elector who has a religious objection to being photographed, a
valid-without-photo driver's license or a valid-without-photo identification card issued by
the Department of Transportation.
(2) For an elector who appears to vote under section 1210, a document that:
(i) shows the name of the individual to whom the document was issued and the name
substantially conforms to the name of the individual as it appears in the district register;
(ii) shows a photograph of the individual to whom the document was issued;
(iii) includes an expiration date and is not expired, except:
(A) for a document issued by the Department of Transportation which is not more than
twelve (12) months past the expiration date; or
(B) in the case of a document from an agency of the Armed forces of the United States or
their reserve components, including the Pennsylvania National Guard, establishing that
the elector is a current member of or a veteran of the United States Armed Forces or
National Guard which does not designate a specific date on which the document expires,
but includes a designation that the expiration date is indefinite; and
(iv) was issued by one of the following:
(A) The United States Government.
(B) The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
(C) A municipality of this Commonwealth to an employee of that municipality.
(D) An accredited Pennsylvania public or private institution of higher learning.
(E) A Pennsylvania care facility.
Id.
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identification showing the name and address of the elector.85 In addition, Act 18
required the Secretary of the Commonwealth to disseminate information to the
public regarding the new photo identification requirement, and further required the
Department of Transportation to issue a free identification card to any registered
elector who applies and who includes an affirmation that he or she does not possess
photo identification.86 Despite the claims by proponents in the Pennsylvania
Legislature that Act 18 was meant to help curb voter fraud in the state, Republican
State House Majority Leader Mike Turzai openly suggested that the real intent of
the law was to aid the Republican Party politically.87 In response, several
individuals and organizations filed a suit against the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania seeking a preliminary injunction of the enforcement and
implementation of Act 18.88
In the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, opponents of Act 18 issued a
facial challenge by claiming that Act 18 violated the Pennsylvania Constitution in
the following three ways: (1) by unduly burdening the fundamental right to vote in
violation of Article I, Section 5; (2) by imposing unequal burdens on the right to
vote upon voters in violation of the equal protection guarantees of Article I,
Sections 1 and 26; and (3) by imposing an additional qualification on the right to
vote in violation of Article VII, Section 1.89 To prevail in the trial court, the
opponents of Act 18 carried the burden of establishing all of the requirements of a
preliminary injunction.90 The Commonwealth Court held that the opponents of Act
18 failed to establish the following requirements of a preliminary injunction: (a)
that immediate and irreparable harm would result from the implementation of Act
18, because they failed to establish that “disenfranchisement was immediate or
inevitable;”91 (b) that greater injury would occur from refusing to grant the
injunction than from granting it, because the public outreach and education
components of implementation of Act 18 were much harder to start or restart than
85. Id. The alternative forms of acceptable non-photo identification included the following: “(1)
nonphoto identification issued by the Commonwealth, or any agency thereof; (2) nonphoto
identification issued by the United States Government, or agency thereof; (3) a firearm permit; (4) a
current utility bill; (5) a current bank statement; (6) a paycheck; [or] (7) a government check.” Id.
86. Id.
87. Kelly Cernetich, Turzai: Voter ID Law Means Romney Can Win PA, POLITICS PA (June 25,
2012, 12:53 PM), http://www.politicspa.com/turzai-voter-id-law-means-romney-can-win-pa/37153/ (In
a speech at a Republican State Committee meeting, Turzai said: “We are focused on making sure that
we meet our obligations that we’ve talked about for years. . . . Voter ID, which is gonna allow Governor
Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania, [is] done.”).
88. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Aug. 15, 2012), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
89. Id.
90. Id. at *3. The elements of a preliminary injunction include the following:
(1) relief is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be
adequately compensated by money damages; (2) greater injury will occur from refusing
to grant the injunction than from granting it; (3) the injunction will restore the parties to
their status quo as it existed before the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) the petitioner is
likely to prevail on the merits; (5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the
offending activity; and, (6) the public interest will not be harmed if the injunction is
granted.
Id. (citing Brayman Constr. Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 13 A.3d 925, 935 (Pa. 2011)).
91. Id.
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to stop;92 and (c) that the opponents of Act 18 would likely prevail on the merits.93
In analyzing the likelihood that the opponents of Act 18 would prevail, the
Commonwealth Court favored the more deferential “flexible standard” approach
set forth in Anderson and applied in Crawford over the “strict scrutiny” approach
advocated by the opponents of Act 18.94 The court used the “flexible standard”
approach of balancing the burdens against the legitimate state interest, and held that
Act 18 on its face does not “expressly disenfranchise or burden any qualified
elector or group of electors,” but instead “applies equally to all qualified voters
[because] to vote in person, everyone must present a photo ID95 that can be
obtained for free.”96 For purposes of the preliminary injunction, the court
concluded that Act 18 imposed “only a limited burden on voters’ rights, and the
burden [did] not outweigh the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”97
In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the Commonwealth’s stated
justifications for the photo ID law, which were to “improve the security and
integrity of elections in Pennsylvania in a manner that [was] in keeping with the
photo ID requirements of many other secure institutions and processes,” and to use
the photo ID requirement as “a tool to detect and deter voter fraud.”98 However,
the Commonwealth had stipulated that despite these stated justifications, it did not
know of any incidents, investigations, or prosecutions of in-person voter fraud in
Pennsylvania or in any other states.99 Nevertheless, the court held that the absence
of proof of in-person voter fraud in Pennsylvania was not dispositive.100 Thus, the
court concluded that Act 18’s photo ID requirement was “a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory, non-severe burden when viewed in the broader context of the
92. Id. at *5.
93. Id. at *6.
94. Id. at **16-17; see Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 n.8 (2008).
95. The Commonwealth Court based its prediction that qualified electors would not be
disenfranchised by Act 18 on “the believable testimony about the pending [Pennsylvania Department of
State] photo IDs for voting, and the enhanced availability of birth confirmation through the Department
of Health for those born in Pennsylvania.” Id. at *4.
96. Id. at *9.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *27.
99. Id. at *28. Both the Commonwealth and the opponents of Act 18 stipulated to the following
facts:
1. There have been no investigations or prosecutions of in-person voter fraud in
Pennsylvania; and the parties do not have direct personal knowledge of any such
investigations or prosecutions in other states;
2. The parties are not aware of any incidents of in-person voter fraud in Pennsylvania and
do not have direct personal knowledge of in person voter fraud elsewhere;
3. [The Commonwealth] will not offer any evidence in this action that in-person voter
fraud has in fact occurred in Pennsylvania or elsewhere; . . .
5. [The Commonwealth] will not offer any evidence or argument that in person voter
fraud is likely to occur in November 2012 in the absence of the Photo ID law
Id.
100. Id. The court also considered the comments of House Majority Leader Mike Turzai, determining
that the evidence did not invalidate the interests supporting Act 18 because the statement was made
away from the chamber floor of the General Assembly and because “if a nondiscriminatory law is
supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply because
partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators.” Id. (quoting
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008)).
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widespread use of photo ID in daily life,” and that “[t]he Commonwealth's asserted
interest in protecting public confidence in elections [was] a relevant and legitimate
state interest sufficiently weighty to justify the burden.”101
On appeal, the opponents of Act 18 reasserted their facial constitutional
challenge to the law and sought to preliminarily enjoin its implementation, arguing
that due to limitations in the Commonwealth’s identification card issuing
infrastructure,102 a number of qualified Pennsylvania electors would not have had
an adequate opportunity to become educated about Act 18’s requirements and
obtain the necessary identification cards, and would thus be disenfranchised in the
upcoming November 2012 general election.103 In reviewing the opinion of the
Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the lower
court’s predictive judgment rested primarily on the assumption that the
Commonwealth’s efforts both to educate the voting public and to compensate for
the barriers to receiving identification cards from the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation would sufficiently prevent the possibility of disenfranchisement.104
Given the state of affairs at the time of the appeal, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania vacated the lower court’s order and remanded for the court to
determine whether the Commonwealth’s procedures for issuing alternative
identification cards comported with the requirement of Act 18’s “liberal access”
requirement.105 If these procedures did not meet the liberal access requirement, the
Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth Court was obligated to enter a
preliminary injunction.106
On remand, the Commonwealth Court held that the Commonwealth’s
proposed changes did not cure the deficiency in the liberal access requirement of
Act 18.107 After reviewing evidence108 on the number of photo identification cards
issued to date, the court explained that it was no longer convinced of its predictive
judgment that no voter disenfranchisement would result from the Commonwealth’s

101. Id. at *29.
102. On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that Act 18 was not being implemented according to
its terms, due to inconsistencies between the law’s requirements for ID applications and the higher
standard that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation requires for its ID applications. In
addition, the Pennsylvania Departments of State and Transportation acknowledged that under the
current regime, some registered voters will not be able to qualify for a Department of Transportation
identification card in time for the 2012 General Election. Finally, officials from the Departments of
State and Transportation testified that if the law was enforced “in a manner that prevents qualified and
eligible electors from voting, the integrity of the upcoming General Election [would] be impaired.”
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 3-4 (Pa. 2012).
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also instructed the Commonwealth Court that it
may not base its predictive judgment merely on the assurances of government officials. Id.
106. Id.
107. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Oct. 2, 2012).
108. As of September 25, 2012, between 9,300 and 9,500 Department of Transportation voting IDs
and between 1,300 and 1,350 Department of State voting IDs had been issued. According to
Department of Transportation statistics, the period of March 2012 to September 2012 showed only a
slight increase in the number of initial drivers’ licenses and initial photo IDs issued in Pennsylvania than
over the same period in 2011. Id.
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implementation of Act 18 for the 2012 general election.109 Accepting the
opponents of Act 18’s argument that the gap between the photo IDs issued and the
estimated need would not be closed in the remaining five weeks before the election,
the Commonwealth Court preliminarily enjoined the implementation of Act 18’s
photo identification requirement for the 2012 general election.110
B. Wisconsin
In 2011, Wisconsin enacted a voter identification law (“Act 23”) mandating
that qualified electors display acceptable government-sanctioned photo
identification either at the polls or to election officials by 4:00 p.m. on the Friday
after election day.111 To accommodate qualified electors who did not have photo
identification, the legislature required the Department of Transportation to issue
free photo identification cards to qualified electors.112 Two separate legal actions
were filed simultaneously in response, challenging the implementation of the law
both generally and specifically for the forthcoming 2012 general election.113
In League of Women Voters,114 the Dane County Circuit Court permanently
enjoined implementation of Act 23’s photo ID requirement.115 That court held that
Act 23 was unconstitutional because it disqualified otherwise qualified electors
from voting, a violation of the Wisconsin Constitution, which specifies that
“[e]very United States citizen . . . who is a resident of an election district in this
state is a qualified elector in that district.”116 Under the state constitution, the
government may exclude from voting only those either (a) convicted of a felony, or
(b) adjudged by a court to be incompetent to understand the objective of the
elective process.117 While recognizing that the legislature had the power to regulate
the mode, manner, and timing of the electoral process, the court stated that the
legislature did not have the right to destroy or substantially impair the right of a
qualified elector to cast his or her ballot.118 The court held that Act 23 was
unconstitutional because its photo ID requirements were not merely elections
regulations but “impermissibly eliminate[d] the right of suffrage altogether for
certain constitutionally qualified electors.”119
In Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP,120 the Dane County Circuit Court issued
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id. at **2-3.
111. Act of May 25, 2011, 2011 Wisconsin Act 23, §§ 18, 90, 2011-2012 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 23
(2011 A.B. 7) (West) (creating, amending, repealing, and renumbering statutes related to voter
identification requirements).
112. Id. §138.
113. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669, 2012 WL
763586 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 12, 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012
WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 6, 2012).
114. 2012 WL 763586.
115. Id. at *5.
116. Id.; WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1.
117. WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2.
118. League of Women Voters, 2012 WL 763586, at *3.
119. Id. at *4.
120. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 6, 2012).
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a temporary injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the photo
identification requirements of Act 23.121 The court based its decision on the
probability of success of the plaintiff’s argument that the photo ID requirements
violated the Wisconsin Constitution by unreasonably burdening the right to vote
and denying substantive due process and equal protection.122 The court held that
because the right to vote is a fundamental interest in Wisconsin, the court should
apply “a strict or heightened standard of review to determine [if Act 23] remains
within that range of authority permitted under the constitution.”123 The court held
that the sweep and impact of Act 23 was very broad, and had not been “sufficiently
focused to avoid needless and significant impairment of the right to vote.”124
In addition, the court offered three reasons why Crawford did not control the
case’s outcome. First, the court held that Wisconsin’s Constitution, unlike the
United States Constitution, expressly guaranteed the right to vote. Second, the
court held that the Indiana law in Crawford was less rigid than Act 23 because it
allowed for alternative voting opportunities for voters who lacked photo ID. Third,
the court held that while Crawford came to the Court based upon a flawed factual
record lacking substantial evidence of voter disenfranchisement, this case did not
suffer from the same inadequacy.125
The State of Wisconsin appealed both cases, which were both certified for
appeal by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.126 However, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court denied both petitions for appeal.127 Thus, the photo identification
requirements of Act 23 were invalidated, and Wisconsin voters do not need to
display a photo ID to gain access to the polls.
C. Texas
On May 27, 2011, Texas passed Senate Bill 14 (“SB 14”) requiring photo
identification at the polls. However, because Texas was a jurisdiction covered by
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Texas needed to obtain preclearance from either
the United States Attorney or a three-judge panel of the D.C. Federal District Court
before it could implement any changes to its voting procedures.128 To obtain
preclearance, Texas needed to demonstrate that SB 14 “neither has the purpose nor
will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,]
color,” or “member[ship] [in] a language minority group.”129 Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act prohibits covered states from implementing voting laws that will
121. Id. at *7.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *5.
124. Id. at *6.
125. Id. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that 221,975 eligible Wisconsin voters did not possess photo
identification. Id. at *2.
126. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2012AP584, 2012 WL
1020229 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 811 N.W.2d. 821 (Wis. 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the
NAACP v. Walker, No. 2012AP557-LV, 2012 WL 1020254 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 811
N.W.2d. 821 (Wis. 2012).
127. League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc. v. Walker, 811 N.W.2d. 821
(Wis. 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 811 N.W.2d. 821 (Wis. 2012).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
129. Id. §§ 1973c(a), 1973b(f)(2).
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have a retrogressive effect on racial minorities. Furthermore, the covered
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof, which means that it must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that a proposed voting change lacks both
discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect.130
Replacing less stringent Texas voting laws, SB 14 required in-person voters to
identify themselves at the polls using one of five approved government-issued
forms of photo identification.131 SB 14 also prohibited the use of photo IDs that
have expired more than sixty days before being presented at the polls.132 Voters
who did not have an acceptable form of photo ID under SB 14 were able to obtain
at the Texas Department of Public Safety a photographic “election identification
certificate” (“EIC”), a pocket-sized card that resembles a driver’s license, for use at
the polls.133 Furthermore, SB 14 made EICs available at the Texas Department of
Public Safety free of charge. However, because voters needed to spend money
both to travel to the nearest Department of Public Safety office and to obtain the
required identifying documentation,134 EICs were not completely without cost.
The D.C. Federal District Court held that SB 14, if implemented, would have
“a retrogressive effect on Hispanic and African American voters” in Texas, which
is impermissible under the Voting Rights Act.135 In support of this holding, the
court outlined three basic rationales and facts related to the implementation of SB
14 in Texas: (a) a substantial subgroup of Texas voters,136 a large number of which
are African American or Hispanic, lacked a photo ID; (b) the burdens associated
with obtaining a photo ID weighed most heavily on the poor; and (c) racial
minorities in Texas were disproportionately likely to live in poverty.137 Thus, the
court held that SB 14 would likely impermissibly deny or abridge the right to vote
on account of race, making it ineligible for preclearance under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act because of its likely discriminatory effect in Texas.138
Shelby County breathed new life into the dispute over voter ID laws in Texas.
Hours after Texas was no longer subject to federal preclearance under section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, the Texas Legislature swiftly moved forward to reenact SB

130. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973).
131. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 63.0101 (West 2012). The five forms of acceptable governmentissued photo identification include: (1) a Texas driver's license or personal ID card; (2) a Texas license
to carry a concealed handgun; (3) a U.S. military ID card; (4) a U.S. citizenship certificate with
photograph; or (5) a U.S. passport. Id.
132. Id.
133. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521A.001(e) (West 2012).
134. SB 14 requires EIC applicants to present at least one of the following underlying forms of
identification: (a) an expired Texas driver’s license or personal ID card, (b) an original or certified copy
of a birth certificate, (c) U.S. citizenship or naturalization papers, or (d) a court order indicating a
change of name and/or gender. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 15.182 (2012).
135. Texas v. Holder, 888 F.Supp.2d. 113, 138 (D.D.C. 2012).
136. Texas submitted to the U.S. Attorney General a computer-generated list of 795,955 registered
voters it was unable to match with corresponding entries in the Texas Department of Public Service's
driver's license and personal ID database. Texas estimated that this “no-match” list consisted of
approximately 304,389 voters (38.2%) who were Hispanic and 491,566 (61.8%) who are non-Hispanic.
Id. at 117.
137. Id. at 138.
138. Id. at 143-44.
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14.139 In response, minority groups in Texas and the Department of Justice have
asked a Texas court to return the state to federal preclearance requirements.140 As
of the date of publication of this Comment, this challenge is still pending.
V. RECENT TRENDS IN VOTER FRAUD
A. The Myth of Voter Fraud
Since the elections of 2000, only seven convictions have occurred for voter
impersonation fraud in the United States.141 None of these convictions involved a
conspiracy to commit voter impersonation fraud.142 In addition, a report published
by the New York Times in 2007 revealed that election fraud was extremely rare,
finding that an aggressive five-year investigation into voter fraud by the Bush
Administration’s Department of Justice resulted in only eighty-six convictions of
any kind of election crime throughout the country.143 Tellingly, in researching his
book, “The Voting Wars,” Richard Hasen reported that he could not find a single
case since 1980 when “an election outcome could plausibly have turned on voterimpersonation fraud.”144 After years of painstaking research, Lorraine Minnite
confirmed that voter fraud is rare in the United States, describing the concept of
voter fraud as “a politically constructed myth.”145
One such example of voter fraud was exposed during the 2012 election season
in the important swing state of Florida. In August 2012, Florida resident Josef
Sever pleaded guilty to illegally voting in the November 4, 2008, presidential
election.146 Born in Austria, Sever is a Canadian citizen, and admitted to
registering and voting in at least two presidential elections.147 His conviction of
illegal voting represented the only case of immigrant voter fraud being investigated
by Florida state law enforcement in 2012.148 Sever’s illegal voting was discovered
during Florida Governor Rick Scott’s controversial effort to purge non-citizens
from Florida’s voting rolls by using information from Florida’s motor vehicle

139. Sarah Childress, With Voting Rights Act Out, States Push Voter ID Laws, FRONTLINE (June 26,
2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/with-votingrights-act-out-states-push-voter-id-laws. In addition to Texas, South Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, and
Mississippi have either passed or have expressed interest in passing voter ID laws now that they no
longer require federal preclearance. Id.
140. Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/holder-wants-texas-to-clear-voting-changeswith-the-us.html.
141. Jane Mayer, The Voter Fraud Myth, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 2012,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/10/29/121029fa_fact_mayer.
142. Id.
143. Eric Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/washington/12fraud.html.
144. Mayer, supra note 141.
145. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 6 (2010).
146. Toluse Olorunnipa, Canadian Man Living in Broward Pleads Guilty to Voting Illegally in ‘08
Presidential Election, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 30, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/30/
2977205/canadian-man-living-in-broward.html.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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agency.149 Despite the fact that Florida’s Department of State amassed a list of
180,000 potential non-citizens registered to vote in Florida, the Department only
sent Josef Sever’s name to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to conduct
a criminal investigation.150 Outside of Governor Scott’s effort to purge Florida’s
voting rolls of registered non-citizens, in 2012 the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement reported that it was investigating, in a state of more than eleven
million registered voters, a total of six cases of potential voter fraud.151
Interestingly, the case of Josef Sever in Florida is a type of voter fraud that
could not have been avoided with the implementation of a strict voter identification
requirement. As a registered voter in Florida, Sever would have still been eligible
to vote on election day. The reason for this is because he had unlawfully registered
himself as a voter in Florida, which means that all he had to do to receive a ballot
on election day was to show photo identification that he was the registered voter on
Florida’s voting rolls. Thus, a strict voter identification law in Florida would not
have prevented Josef Sever, one of the few people to have committed voter fraud in
the United States, from fraudulently voting in two presidential elections.
B. Negative Effects of Voter Identification Laws
According to a study conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice, eleven
percent of the voting age population lacks the type of voter identification cards
required to vote in the states with the strictest voter identification laws.152 This
population of eligible voters who nevertheless do not have proper documentation in
these states includes twenty-five percent of African Americans, sixteen percent of
Hispanics, and eighteen percent of Americans over the age of sixty-five.153 In
contrast, only nine percent of eligible white voters do not have proper photo
identification.154
Another study, conducted by Cathy Cohen of the University of Chicago and
Jon Rogowski of Washington University prior to the 2012 presidential election,
predicted that the rise of voter identification laws since the 2008 election would
have a negative impact on voter turnout for young people of color aged 18-29.155
Overall, the study estimated that up to twenty-five percent of eligible young voters
of color between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine could become demobilized
by new voter identification laws, which would account for a decrease in voter
participation ranging from 538,000 to 696,000 votes compared to turnout figures
from the previous two presidential elections.156 In addition, the study cited three
races in the U.S. House of Representatives among the several that could by affected
by the “disproportionate demobilization” of young minorities from state voter
identification laws, including Georgia’s 12th District, Pennsylvania’s 6th District,
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. GASKINS & IYER, supra note 4, at 1.
153. Id. at 2.
154. Sonya Ross, Study: ID Laws Could Trip Up Young Minority Voters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept.
12, 2012, 2:53 AM, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/study-id-laws-could-trip-young-minority-voters.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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and Tennessee’s 9th District.157
Several factors may explain why a disproportionate percentage of young
minorities do not have a proper form of photo identification required by strict state
voter identification laws. First and foremost, state voter identification laws have
strict requirements for which forms of photo identification are allowed.158 Marc
Morial, President of the National Urban League, described state voter identification
laws as, “not about having ID. [These are] about having a specific type of ID. You
can’t show up with your Sam’s Club card and vote.”159 For example, young
minority voters tend to be poorer and more transient, which means they are less
likely to have a current address on their driver’s licenses or other forms of
identification.160 Driver’s licenses are also easily suspended or revoked due to
unpaid fines.161 Finally, for those voters who do not have photo identification, it
can be extremely difficult to pull together the necessary documentation to obtain a
valid form of photo identification, which may also present additional administrative
hurdles and costs to the voter.162
VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
A. Articulating a Meaningful Standard of Review
A better defined standard is needed to provide guidance to states in drafting
election laws that do not create an undue burden on qualified voters. Blind
adherence to the notion that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud is the sole
means of protecting the integrity and reliability of a state’s elections does not serve
as a useful guide to the states. Voter ID laws are not the sole means of protecting
voter confidence in the democratic process. In fact, no evidence exists that
universal voter identification requirements would actually raise public confidence
in the electoral process.163 Thus, at the very least the balancing test favored in
Crawford should not be so lopsided that the burdens imposed by voter ID laws are
largely downplayed or ignored.
In addition, the Court’s rationale in Crawford relied heavily on the availability
of provisional ballots as an alternative for Indiana voters lacking appropriate photo
identification at the polls, making Indiana’s law a model for states seeking to enact
voter ID requirements. However, two concerns remain about the deterrent effect of
this alternative. First, evidence from the polls in Indiana suggests that a majority of
voters who cast provisional ballots due to lack of appropriate photo identification

157. Id.
158. See, e.g., WENDY R. WEISER & LAWRENCE NORDEN, VOTING LAW CHANGES IN 2012 5-6
(Brennan Center for Justice ed., 2011).
159. Ross, supra note 154.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of
Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1759
(2008).
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do not return to have their provisional ballots counted.164 Second, even with this
alternative for voters without IDs, the risk of misinformation and voter intimidation
still exists. Eligible voters who lack the appropriate photo identification could be
afraid that they will be turned away from the polls, or worse, that they could be
prosecuted for attempting to commit voter fraud. For example, in upholding a
Tennessee statute barring political posters or signs within 100 feet of polling
places, the Supreme Court recognized that preventing voter intimidation was a
compelling governmental interest.165 Eligible voters continue to experience
burdens under voter ID laws with the provisional balloting alternative, and are still
likely to be disenfranchised by these laws.
It is also important to note that the administration of elections in the United
States is not immune to partisan influences. In many cases, state and local election
officials “are either elected in partisan elections as Democrats or Republicans, or
are appointed and supervised by partisans.”166 Richard Hasen likens the
management of U.S. elections to “allowing the foxes to guard the henhouse.”167
Because the United States lacks an independent and impartial body to administer
elections, courts must act to protect the rights of voters in the face of partisan
influences affecting the electoral process for political gain. The Crawford
standard, however, provides inadequate protection to these essential democratic
rights.
Courts should instead use a standard of review that actually takes into equal
consideration the interests of the state and the burdens on eligible voters. The
balancing approach of Crawford is inadequate because it fails to account for the
interests and burdens asserted by weighing the number of eligible voters estimated
to be disenfranchised by the law against the estimated impact of eliminating voter
fraud. A one-by-one comparison of the estimated number of fraudulent votes
prevented against the estimated number of eligible voters disenfranchised is not
inconsistent with the important role voting and elections play in the democratic
process. Instead of applying the Crawford balancing test, the Supreme Court
should apply a heightened scrutiny standard to new laws dealing with voter
qualifications. While strict scrutiny could make it difficult for states to make
changes to election laws, the use of intermediate scrutiny for changes to state
election laws is a way of balancing the competing interests of preserving voting
integrity and preventing voter disenfranchisement. Heightened scrutiny seems
especially apt given the fact that the Crawford balancing test upheld Indiana’s voter
ID law despite Indiana’s inability to point to a single instance of in-person voter
impersonation fraud in its entire history.168
Indiana’s fantasy with voter fraud is not unique. As discussed above, voter
fraud is almost non-existent in the United States. The vast majority of states that
have enacted photo ID laws as a means of combatting voter fraud have yet to
164. Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls Through
an Examination of Provisional Balloting, 24 J.L. & POL. 475, 504 (2008).
165. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).
166. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION
MELTDOWN xi (2012).
167. Id.
168. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194 (2008).
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actually experience any voter fraud, and have no indications that voter fraud is
likely to become a problem in the future. For this reason, state legislation requiring
photo identification at the polls is a solution in search of a problem.
In addition, states with photo identification laws that offer free photo
identification to registered voters require them to provide copies of official
documents that are costly and burdensome to acquire. For example, Pennsylvania
voters need to provide an original copy of their birth certificate and a proof of
address to apply for photo identification issued free of charge by the State of
Pennsylvania. As the commonwealth court noted on remand in Applewhite,
Pennsylvania had failed to issue a sufficient amount of photo IDs to registered
voters in time for the 2012 General Election despite its statutory campaign of
providing free photo IDs to the registered voters of Pennsylvania.169 Thus, despite
the commonwealth court’s lengthy justification of Pennsylvania’s voter ID law,
which relied heavily on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the court nevertheless was
not convinced that implementation of the voter ID law for the 2012 general election
would not disenfranchise a large portion of Pennsylvania’s electorate.170
While the Court in Crawford minimized the burden on voters needing to travel
to their closest State Bureau of Motor Vehicles to receive a photo identification, the
costs involved with the so-called “free” photo identification provided by the states
have significant constitutional ramifications. Dissenting in Crawford, Justice
Breyer argued that the costs of obtaining the underlying documentation to qualify
for Indiana’s “free” photo identification could be considered by some as unduly
burdensome.171 In 1966, the Court held in Harper that a poll tax of $1.50 was
unconstitutionally burdensome,172 which, adjusted for inflation, would be
approximately $10 today.173 In Indiana, the cost of obtaining a birth certificate in
2008 was $12.174
The only way to prevent “free” state-issued photo identification from being
considered a poll-tax is to either remove the birth certificate requirement or provide
birth certificates free of charge. Both of these options are problematic, however,
because removing the birth certificate requirement could potentially allow
noncitizen residents to obtain voter identification, and residents born out of state
would still need to pay a fee to obtain their birth certificates.
B. Conclusion
Harper solidified the notion that voting is a fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution.175 As a fundamental right, voting receives special protection from
federal and state legislation by “a more exacting judicial scrutiny.”176 Instead of
relying solely on a patchwork of state constitutional rights, the right to vote is also
169. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Oct. 2, 2012).
170. Id. at *3.
171. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 239 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 n.1 (1966).
173. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 239 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665.
176. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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protected under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.177
Voting rights in the United States should not differ based on where citizens live –
our system of federalism does not allow for state experimentation with the
fundamental rights of its citizens. Crawford’s balancing approach gives too much
power to the states to enact legislation that impinges upon voting rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized the important role voting plays in the
democratic process. Indeed, voting is integral to our nation’s ability to function as
a true democracy. Voter ID laws have the potential to significantly interfere with
our nation’s democratic process, and as such should be scrutinized with a more
meaningful standard of review than the one articulated by the Court in Crawford.
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